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SATISFACTION IS NOT ABSOLUTE
JOEL DAVID HAMKINS AND RUIZHI YANG
Abstract. We prove that the satisfaction relation N |= ϕ[~a] of
first-order logic is not absolute between models of set theory having
the structure N and the formulas ϕ all in common. Two models
of set theory can have the same natural numbers, for example, and
the same standard model of arithmetic 〈N,+, ·, 0, 1,<〉, yet disagree
on their theories of arithmetic truth; two models of set theory can
have the same natural numbers and the same arithmetic truths, yet
disagree on their truths-about-truth, at any desired level of the
iterated truth-predicate hierarchy; two models of set theory can
have the same natural numbers and the same reals, yet disagree
on projective truth; two models of set theory can have the same
〈Hω2 ,∈〉 or the same rank-initial segment 〈Vδ,∈〉, yet disagree on
which assertions are true in these structures.
On the basis of these mathematical results, we argue that a
philosophical commitment to the determinateness of the theory of
truth for a structure cannot be seen as a consequence solely of
the determinateness of the structure in which that truth resides.
The determinate nature of arithmetic truth, for example, is not
a consequence of the determinate nature of the arithmetic struc-
ture N = { 0, 1, 2, . . .} itself, but rather, we argue, is an additional
higher-order commitment requiring its own analysis and justifica-
tion.
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1. Introduction
Many mathematicians and philosophers regard the natural numbers
0, 1, 2, . . . , along with their usual arithmetic structure, as having a
privileged mathematical existence, a Platonic realm in which asser-
tions have definite, absolute truth values, independently of our ability
to prove or discover them. Although there are some arithmetic asser-
tions that we can neither prove nor refute—such as the consistency of
the background theory in which we undertake our proofs—the view is
that nevertheless there is a fact of the matter about whether any such
arithmetic statement is true or false in the intended interpretation. The
definite nature of arithmetic truth is often seen as a consequence of the
definiteness of the structure of arithmetic 〈N,+, ·, 0, 1, <〉 itself, for if
the natural numbers exist in a clear and distinct totality in a way that
is unambiguous and absolute, then (on this view) the first-order theory
of truth residing in that structure—arithmetic truth—is similarly clear
and distinct.
Feferman provides an instance of this perspective when he writes:
In my view, the conception [of the bare structure of
the natural numbers] is completely clear, and thence all
arithmetical statements are definite. [Fef13, p.6–7] (em-
phasis original)
It is Feferman’s ‘thence’ to which we call attention, and many math-
ematicians and philosophers seem to share this perspective. Martin
writes:
What I am suggesting is that the real reason for con-
fidence in first-order completeness is our confidence in
the full determinateness of the concept of the natural
numbers. [Mar12, p. 13]
The truth of an arithmetic statement, to be sure, does seem to depend
entirely on the structure 〈N,+, ·, 0, 1, <〉, with all quantifiers restricted
to N and using only those arithmetic operations and relations, and so if
that structure has a definite nature, then it would seem that the truth
of the statement should be similarly definite.
Nevertheless, in this article we should like to tease apart these two
ontological commitments, arguing that the definiteness of truth for a
given mathematical structure, such as the natural numbers, the reals
or higher-order structures such as Hω2 or Vδ, does not follow from the
definite nature of the underlying structure in which that truth resides.
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Rather, we argue that the commitment to a theory of truth for a struc-
ture is a higher-order ontological commitment, going strictly beyond
the commitment to a definite nature for the underlying structure itself.
We shall make our argument by first proving, as a strictly mathe-
matical matter, that different models of set theory can have a structure
identically in common, even the natural numbers, yet disagree on the
theory of truth for that structure.
• Models of set theory can have the same structure of arithmetic
〈N,+, ·, 0, 1, <〉, yet disagree on arithmetic truth.
• Models of set theory can have the same reals, yet disagree on
projective truth.
• Models of set theory can have a transitive rank initial segment
Vδ in common, yet disagree about whether it is a model of ZFC.
In these cases and many others, the theory of a structure is not abso-
lute between models of set theory having that structure identically in
common. This is a stronger kind of non-absoluteness phenomenon than
the usual observation, via the incompleteness theorem, that models of
set theory can disagree on arithmetic truth, for here we have models
of set theory, which disagree about arithmetic truth, yet agree on the
structure in which that truth resides. Our mathematical claims will be
made in sections 2 through 5. Afterwards, on the basis of these math-
ematical observations, we shall draw our philosophical conclusions in
section 6.
Satisfaction is absolute! This slogan, heard by the first author in
his graduate-student days—a fellow logic student would assert it with
exaggerated double-entendre—was meant to evoke the idea that the
satisfaction relation N |= ϕ[~a] is absolute between all the various mod-
els of set theory able to express it. The set-theoretic universe V , for
example, has the same arithmetic truths as the constructible universe
L; and it doesn’t matter, when asking whether N |= ϕ[~a], whether one
determines the answer in the universe V or in a forcing extension V [G]
of it. So the slogan is true to a very high degree, and in particular, it
is true whenever the formula ϕ has standard-finite length in the meta-
theory (which is probably closer to what was actually meant by those
asserting it), or between any two models of set theory, at least one of
which has access to the satisfaction relation of the other (which covers
such cases as L ⊆ V and V ⊆ V [G]), since any model of set theory that
can see two satisfaction relations for a structure will see by induction
on formulas that they must agree. Nevertheless, the main theorems of
this article show that the slogan is not true in full generality, namely,
satisfaction is not absolute, for there can be models of set theory with
4 HAMKINS AND YANG
a structure N and sentence σ in common, but which disagree about
whether N |= σ.
Before proceeding further, we should like to remark on the folklore
nature of some of the mathematical arguments and results contained in
sections 2 through 5 of this article, including theorems 1 and 5 and their
consequences, which are proved using only well-known classical meth-
ods. These arguments should be considered as a part of the mathemat-
ical folklore of the subject of models of arithmetic, a subject filled with
many fascinating results about automorphisms of nonstandard models
of arithmetic and of set theory and the images of non-definable sets
in computably saturated models. For example, Schlipf [Sch78] proved
many basic results about computably saturated models, including the
case of 〈M, X〉 where X is not definable in M , a case which figures in
our theorems 1 and 5. For example, Schlipf proves that if M |= ZF is
resplendent, then there is a cofinal set of indiscernibles I in the ordinals
of M such that for each α ∈ I we have VMα ≺ M and V
M
α
∼= M; if
M is also countable and VMα ≺ M, then there are 2
ω many distinct
isomorphisms VMα
∼= M; and M is isomorphic to some topless ini-
tial N ≺ M, that is, for which M has no supremum to the ordinals
of N . Kossak and Kotlarski [KK88] identified circumstances under
which a nondefinable subset X of a countable model M |= PA must
have the maximum number of automorphic images inM, including the
case where X is an inductive satisfaction class. Schmerl subsequently
proved that every undefinable class X in such a model M has contin-
uum many automorphic images. In other work, Kossak and Kotlarski
[KK92] proved that if M is a model of PA with a full inductive sat-
isfaction class, then it has full inductive satisfaction classes S1 and S2
which disagree on a set of sentences that is coinitial with the standard
cut. So the topic is well-developed and much is known. Concerning the
specific results we prove in this article, experts in the area seem instinc-
tively to want to prove them by means of resplendency and the other
sophisticated contemporary ideas that frame the current understanding
of the subject—showing the depth and power of those methods—and
indeed one may prove the theorems via resplendency. Nevertheless, our
arguments here show that elementary methods suffice.
2. Indefinite arithmetic truth
Let us begin with what may seem naively to be a surprising case,
where we have two models of set theory with the same structure of
arithmetic 〈N,+, ·, 0, 1, <〉, but different theories of arithmetic truth.
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Theorem 1. Every consistent extension of ZFC has two models M1
and M2, which agree on the natural numbers and on the structure
〈N,+, ·, 0, 1, <〉M1 = 〈N,+, ·, 0, 1, <〉M2, but which disagree their theo-
ries of arithmetic truth, in the sense that there is in M1 and M2 an
arithmetic sentence σ, such that M1 thinks σ is true, but M2 thinks it
is false.
•
N
M1 M2
M1,M2 |= ZFC
N
M1 = NM2
M1 believes N |= σ
M2 believes N |= ¬σ
Thus, two models of set theory can agree on which natural numbers
exist and agree on all the details of the standard model of arithmetic,
yet disagree on which sentences are true in that model. The proof is
elementary, but before giving the proof, we should like to place the
theorem into the context of some classical results on arithmetic truth,
particularly Krajewski’s work [Kra74, Kra76] on incompatible satisfac-
tion classes, explained in theorem 2.
Inside every model of set theory M |= ZFC, we may extract a
canonical model of arithmetic, the structure 〈N,+, ·, 0, 1, <〉M , which
we henceforth denote simply by NM , arising from what M views as
the standard model of arithmetic. Namely, NM is the structure whose
objects are the objects thatM thinks to be natural numbers and whose
operations and relations agree with what M thinks are the standard
arithmetic operations and relations on the natural numbers. Let us
define that a ZFC-standard model of arithmetic, or just a standard
model of arithmetic (as opposed to the standard model of arithmetic),
is a model of arithmetic that arises in this way as NM for some model
M |= ZFC. In other words, a standard model of arithmetic is one that
is thought to be the standard model of arithmetic from the perspective
of some model of ZFC. More generally, for any set theory T we say that
a model of arithmetic is a T -standard model of arithmetic, if it arises
as NM for some M |= T .
Every model of set theory M |= ZFC has what it thinks is the true
theory of arithmetic TAM , the collection of σ thought by M to be (the
Go¨del code of) a sentence in the language of arithmetic, true in NM .
(In order to simplify notation, we shall henceforth identify formulas
with their Go¨del codes.) The theory TAM is definable in M by means
of the recursive Tarskian definition of truth-in-a-structure, although it
is not definable in NM , by Tarski’s theorem on the non-definability of
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truth. Note that when NM is nonstandard, this theory will include
many nonstandard sentences σ, which do not correspond to any ac-
tual assertion in the language of arithmetic from the perspective of the
metatheory, but nevertheless, these sentences gain a meaningful truth
value inside M , where they appear to be standard, via the Tarski re-
cursion as carried out inside M . In this way, the ZFC-standard models
of arithmetic can be equipped with a notion of truth, which obeys the
recursive requirements of the Tarskian definition.
These relativized truth predicates are instances of the more general
concept of a satisfaction class for a model of arithmetic (see [KS06] and
[Kay91] for general background). Given a model of arithmetic N =
〈N,+, ·, 0, 1, <〉, we say that a subclass Tr ⊆ N is a truth predicate or a
full satisfaction class for N—we shall use the terms interchangeably—
if every element of Tr is a sentence in the language of arithmetic as
viewed by N , and such that Tr obeys the recursive Tarskian definition
of truth:
1. (atomic) For each atomic sentence σ in N , we have σ ∈ Tr just
in case N thinks σ is true. (Note that the value of any closed
term may be uniquely evaluated inside N by an internal recur-
sion, and so every model of arithmetic has a definable relation
for determining the truth of atomic assertions.)
2. (conjunction) σ ∧ τ ∈ Tr if and only if σ ∈ Tr and τ ∈ Tr.
3. (negation) ¬σ ∈ Tr if and only if σ /∈ Tr.
4. (quantifiers) ∃xϕ(x) ∈ Tr if and only if there is some n ∈
N such that ϕ(n¯) ∈ Tr, where n¯ is the corresponding term
1 + · · ·+ 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
n
as constructed in N .
Note that Tr is applied only to assertions in the language of arithmetic,
not to assertions in the expanded language using the truth predicate
itself (but we look at iterated truth predicates in section 3). A truth
predicate Tr for a model N = 〈N,+, ·, 0, 1, <〉 is inductive, if the ex-
panded structure 〈N,+, ·, 0, 1, <,Tr〉 satisfies PA(Tr), the theory of PA
in the language augmented with a predicate symbol for Tr, so that
mentions of Tr may appear in instances of the induction axiom. The
theory of true arithmetic TAM arising in any model of set theory M
is easily seen to be an inductive truth predicate for the correspond-
ing ZFC-standard model of arithmetic NM arising in that model of set
theory, simply because ZFC proves that N satisfies the second-order
Peano axioms.
A principal case of Tarski’s theorem on the non-definability of truth
is the fact that no model of arithmetic N can have a truth predicate
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that is definable in the language of arithmetic. This is simply because
for every arithmetic formula ϕ(x) there is by the Go¨del fixed-point
lemma a sentence σ such that PA ⊢ σ ↔ ¬ϕ(σ), and so we would have
either that σ is true in N while ϕ(σ) fails, or that σ is false in N while
ϕ(σ) holds; either of these possibilities would mean that the collection
of sentences satisfying ϕ could not satisfy the recursive Tarskian truth
requirements, applied up to the logical complexity of σ, which is a
standard finite sentence.
Krajewski observed that a model of arithmetic can have different in-
compatible truth predicates, a fact we find illuminating for the context
of this paper, and so we presently give an account of it. The argu-
ment is pleasantly classical, relying principally only on Beth’s implicit
definability theorem and Tarski’s theorem on the non-definability of
truth.
Theorem 2 ([Kra74, Kra76]). There are models of arithmetic with
different incompatible inductive truth predicates. Indeed, every model
of arithmetic N0 |= PA that admits an (inductive) truth predicate has
an elementary extension N that admits several incompatible (inductive)
truth predicates.
Proof. Let N0 = 〈N0,+, ·, 0, 1, <〉 be any model of arithmetic that ad-
mits a truth predicate (for example, the standard model NM arising
in any model of set theory M). Let T be the theory consisting of the
elementary diagram ∆(N0) of this model, in the language of arithmetic
with constants for every element of N0, together with the assertion “Tr
is a truth predicate,” which is expressible as a single assertion about
Tr, namely, the assertion that it satisfies the recursive Tarskian truth
requirements. The theory T is consistent, because by assumption, N0
itself admits a truth predicate. Furthermore, any model of the theory
T provides an elementary extension N of N0, when reduced to the lan-
guage of arithmetic, together with a truth predicate for N . Suppose
toward contradiction that every elementary extension of N0 that ad-
mits a truth predicate has a unique such class. It follows that any two
models of T with the same reduction to the language of the diagram
of N0 must have the same interpretation for the predicate Tr. Thus,
the predicate Tr is implicitly definable in T , in the sense of the Beth
implicit definability theorem (see [CK90, thm 2.2.22]), and so by that
theorem, the predicate Tr is explicitly definable in any model of T by
a formula in the base language, the language of arithmetic. But this
violates Tarski’s theorem on the non-definability of truth, which im-
plies that no model of arithmetic can have a definable truth predicate.
Thus, there must be a models of T with identical reductions N to the
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language of the diagram of N0, but different truth predicates on N . In
other words, N is an elementary extension of N0 having at least two
different incompatible truth predicates. (And it is not difficult by sim-
ilar reasoning to see that there must be an N having infinitely many
distinct truth predicates.)
In the case where N0 admits an inductive full satisfaction class, we
simply add PA(Tr) to the theory T , with the result by the same reason-
ing that the elementary extension N will also have multiple inductive
full satisfaction classes, as desired. 
In fact, Krajewski [Kra76] proves that we may find elementary ex-
tensions N having at least any desired cardinal κ many such full sat-
isfaction classes.
We observe next the circumstances under which these various satis-
faction classes can become the true theory of arithmetic inside a model
of set theory. First, let’s note the circumstances under which a model
of arithmetic is a ZFC-standard model of arithmetic. Let Th(N)ZFC
be the set of sentences σ in the language of arithmetic, such that
ZFC ⊢ (〈N,+, ·, 0, 1, <〉 |= σ). These are the arithmetic consequences
of ZFC, the sentences that hold in every ZFC-standard model of arith-
metic. If ZFC is consistent, then so is this theory, since it holds in the
standard model of arithmetic of any model of ZFC. More generally, for
any set theory T proving the existence of the standard model N and its
theory TA, we have the theory Th(N)T , consisting of the sentences σ in
the language of arithmetic that T proves to hold in the standard model.
Thanks to Roman Kossak (recently) and Ali Enayat (from some time
ago) for discussions concerning the following proposition. The result
appears in [Ena09] with further related analysis of the ZFC-standard
models of arithmetic.
Proposition 3. The following are equivalent for any countable non-
standard model of arithmetic N .
(1) N is a ZFC-standard model of arithmetic. That is, N = NM
for some M |= ZFC.
(2) N is a computably saturated model of Th(N)ZFC.
Proof. (1 → 2) Suppose that N is a countable nonstandard ZFC-
standard model of arithmetic, arising as N = NM for some countable
M |= ZFC. Clearly, N satisfies the theory Th(N)ZFC. Note also that N
admits an inductive satisfaction class, namely, the collection of arith-
metic truths TAM as they are defined inside M . Any model of PA with
an inductive satisfaction class, we claim, is computably saturated. To
see this, suppose that p(x, ~n) is a computable type in the language of
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arithmetic with parameters ~n ∈ N and that p is finitely realized in
N . Since the type p is computable, the model N computes its own
version of the type pN , and this will agree with p on all the standard-
length formulas. Furthermore, the structure 〈N ,TAM〉 can see that
all the standard-finite initial segments of pN are satisfiable according
to the truth predicate TAM , which by induction in the meta-theory
agrees with actual truth on the standard-finite length formulas. Thus,
by overspill (since we have induction for this predicate), it follows that
some nonstandard length initial segment of pN is satisfied in N , and
in particular p itself is satisfied in N . So N is a countable computably
saturated model of Th(N)ZFC, as desired.
(2 → 1) Conversely, suppose that N is a countable computably
saturated model of Th(N)ZFC. Consider the theory T consisting of
the ZFC axioms together with the assertions σN for every sentence
σ ∈ Th(N ), which is consistent precisely because N |= Th(N)ZFC. By
computable saturation, it follows that T is coded in N , since we may
write down a computable type for this, and so there is a nonstandard
finite theory t ∈ N whose standard part is exactly T . Since N agrees
that any particular finite subtheory of T is consistent, as each such
instance is provable in Th(N)ZFC, we may assume by cutting down to
a nonstandard initial segment that t is consistent in N . Inside N ,
build the canonical complete consistent Henkin theory H extending t,
and let M |= H be the corresponding Henkin model. In particular,
M |= ZFC, since this is a part of t, and so NM is a ZFC-standard
model of arithmetic and hence computably saturated. Note also that
N
M has the same theory as N , because this is part of t and hence
H . The structure N can construct an isomorphism from itself with
an initial segment of NM , because for every a ∈ N it has a Henkin
constant aˇ witnessing aˇ =
a︷ ︸︸ ︷
1 + · · ·+ 1 and it must be part of the theory
that any x < aˇ is some bˇ for some b < a in N , since otherwise N
would think H is inconsistent. It follows that N and NM have the
same standard system. But any two countable computably saturated
models of arithmetic with the same standard system are isomorphic,
by the usual back-and-forth argument, and so N ∼= NM , showing that
N is ZFC-standard, as desired. 
Thus, the countable nonstandard ZFC-standard models of arithmetic
are precisely the countable computably saturated models of Th(N)ZFC.
One may similarly show that every uncountable model of Th(N)ZFC has
an elementary extension to a ZFC-standard model of arithmetic, since
the theory ZFC+ { σN | σ ∈ ∆(N ) } is finitely consistent, where ∆(N )
10 HAMKINS AND YANG
refers to the elementary diagram of N in the language with constants
for every element of N , and any model M of this theory will have NM
as an elementary extension of N , as desired. The equivalence stated
in proposition 3 does not generalize to uncountable models, for there
are uncountable computably saturated models of Th(N)ZFC that are
ω1-like and rather classless, which means in particular that they admit
no inductive truth predicates and therefore are not ZFC-standard.
We shall now extend proposition 3 to the case where the model
carries a truth predicate. Let Th(N,TA)ZFC be the theory consisting
of all sentences σ for which ZFC ⊢ (〈N,+, ·, 0, 1, <,TA〉 |= σ), where
σ is in the language of arithmetic augmented with a truth predicate
and TA refers to the ZFC-definable set of true arithmetic assertions.
If ZFC is consistent, then so is Th(N,TA)ZFC, since it holds in the
standard model of arithmetic, with the standard interpretation of TA,
arising inside any model of ZFC. Note that Th(N,TA)ZFC includes the
assertion that TA is an inductive truth predicate.
Proposition 4. The following are equivalent for any countable non-
standard model of arithmetic N with a truth predicate Tr.
(1) 〈N ,Tr〉 is a ZFC-standard model of arithmetic and arithmetic
truth. That is, N = NM = 〈N,+, ·, 0, 1, <〉M for some M |=
ZFC in which Tr = TAM is the theory of true arithmetic.
(2) 〈N ,Tr〉 is a computably saturated model of Th(N,TA)ZFC.
Proof. The proof of proposition 3 adapts to accommodate the expanded
structure. If a countable nonstandard model 〈N ,Tr〉 arises as 〈N,TA〉M
for some M |= ZFC, then it admits an inductive truth predicate in the
expanded language, and this implies that it is computably saturated
just as above. Conversely, any countably computably saturated model
of Th(N,TA)ZFC can build a model of the corresponding Henkin theory
extending ZFC + { σ〈N,TA〉 | 〈N ,Tr〉 |= σ }. The corresponding Henkin
model M will have 〈N ,Tr〉 as an initial segment of 〈NM ,TA〉, and
so these two models have the same standard system, and since they
also are elementarily equivalent and computably saturated, they are
isomorphic by the back-and-forth construction. So 〈N ,Tr〉 is ZFC-
standard. 
Let us now finally prove theorem 1. We shall give two proofs, one as a
corollary to proposition 4, and another simpler direct proof.
Proof of theorem 1. (as corollary to proposition 4) By Beth’s theorem
as in the proof of theorem 2, we may find two different truth predicates
on the same model of arithmetic, with both 〈N ,Tr1〉 and 〈N ,Tr2〉
being computably saturated models of Th(N,TA)ZFC. It follows by
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proposition 4 that they arise as the standard model inside two different
models of set theory, with N = NM1 = NM2 and Tr1 = TA
M1 and
Tr2 = TA
M2, establishing theorem 1. 
We also give a simpler direct proof, as follows. (Thanks to W. Hugh
Woodin for pointing out a simplification.)
Proof of theorem 1. (direct argument) Suppose that M1 is any count-
able ω-nonstandard model of set theory. It follows that M1’s version
of the standard model of arithmetic 〈N,+, ·, 0, 1, <,TA〉M1 , augmented
with what M1 thinks is the true theory of arithmetic, is countable and
computably saturated. Since TAM1 is not definable in the reduced
structure NM1 = 〈N,+, ·, 0, 1, <〉M1, it follows by saturation that there
is an arithmetic sentence σ ∈ TAM1 realizing the same 1-type in NM1
as another sentence τ in NM1 with τ /∈ TAM1 . To see this, consider
the type p(s, t) containing all formulas ϕ(s)↔ ϕ(t) for ϕ in the meta-
theory, plus the assertions s ∈ TA and t /∈ TA. This is a computable
type, and it is finitely realized in 〈N,+, ·, 0, 1, <,TA〉M1 , precisely be-
cause otherwise we would be able to define TAM1 in NM1. Thus, there
are arithmetic sentences σ and τ in M1, whose Go¨del codes realize the
same 1-type in NM1, but such that M1 thinks that σ is true and τ is
false in NM1. Since these objects have the same 1-type in NM1 , it fol-
lows by the back-and-forth construction that there is an automorphism
π : NM1 → NM1 with π(τ) = σ. Let M2 be a copy of M1, witnessed
by an isomorphism π∗ : M1 → M2 that extends π, so that an element
m ∈ NM1 sits inside M1 the same way that π(m) sits inside M2. Since
π was an automorphism of NM1, the situation is therefore that M1 and
M2 have exactly the same natural numbers N
M1 = NM2. Yet,M1 thinks
that the arithmetic sentence σ is true in the natural numbers, while
M2 thinks σ is false, because M1 thinks τ is false, and so M2 thinks
π(τ) is false, but π(τ) = σ. 
3. Satisfacton is not absolute
In this section we aim to show that the non-absoluteness phenomenon
is pervasive. For any sufficiently rich structure N in any countable
model of set theory M , there are elementary extensions M1 and M2,
which have the structure NM1 = NM2 in common, yet disagree about
the satisfaction relation for this structure, in that M1 thinks N |= σ[~a]
for some formula σ and parameters ~a, while M2 thinks that N |=
¬σ[~a] (see corollary 6). Even more generally, theorem 5 shows that for
any non-definable class S in any structure N in any countable model
of set theory M , there are elementary extensions M1 and M2 of M ,
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which have the structure NM1 = NM2 in common, yet disagree on
the interpretation of the class SM1 6= SM2. We provide several curious
instances as corollary applications.
Theorem 5. Suppose that M is a countable model of set theory, N
is structure in M in a finite language and S ⊆ N is an additional
predicate, S ∈ M , that is not definable in N with parameters. Then
there are elementary extensions M ≺ M1 and M ≺ M2, which agree
on the structure NM1 = NM2, having all the same elements of it, the
same language and the same interpretations for the functions, relations
and constants in this language, yet disagree on the extension of the
additional predicate SM1 6= SM2, even though by elementarity these
predicates have all the properties in M1 and M2, respectively, that S
has in M .
Proof. Fix such a structure N and non-definable class S inside a count-
able model of set theory M . Fix a computable list of constant symbols
for the elements of M . Let M1 be any countable computably saturated
elementary extension of M , in the language with constants for every
element of M . In particular, the structure 〈N , S,m〉M1
m∈NM
is countable
and computably saturated (and this is all we actually require). Since S
is not definable from parameters, there are objects s and t in NM1 with
the same 1-type in 〈N , m〉M1
m∈NM , yet s ∈ S
M1 and t /∈ SM1 . Since this
latter structure is countable and computably saturated, it follows that
there is an automorphism π : N → N with π(t) = s and π(m) = m for
every m ∈ NM . That is, π is an automorphism of NM1 mapping t to
s, and respecting the copy of NM inside NM1. Let M2 be a copy of M1
containing M , witnessed by an isomorphism π∗ : M1 → M2 extending
π and fixing the elements of M . It follows that NM1 = NM2 and M1
thinks s ∈ S, but since M1 thinks t /∈ S, it follows that M2 thinks
π(t) /∈ S and so M2 thinks s /∈ S, as desired. 
Corollary 6. Suppose that M is a countable model of set theory, and
that N is a sufficiently robust structure in M , in a finite language.
Then there are elementary extensions M ≺ M1 and M ≺ M2, which
agree on the natural numbers NM1 = NM2 and on the structure NM1 =
NM2, having all the same elements of it, the same language and the
same interpretations for the functions, relations and constants in this
language, yet they disagree on what they each think is the standard
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satisfaction relation N |= σ[~a] for this structure.
•
N
M1 M2
M ≺ M1,M2 |= ZFC
N
M1 = NM2, NM1 = NM2
there are σ and ~a for which
M1 believes N |= σ[~a]
M2 believes N |= ¬σ[~a]
Proof. By ‘sufficiently robust’ we mean that N = 〈N, . . .〉 interprets
the standard model of arithmetic N, so that it can handle the Go¨del
coding of formulas, and also that it is has a definable pairing function,
so that it contains (Go¨del codes for) all finite tuples of its elements.
We are assuming that N is sufficiently robust from the perspective of
the model M . It foillows by Tarski’s theorem on the non-definability
of truth that the satisfaction relation of M for N—that is, the relation
Sat(ϕ,~a), which holds just in case N |= ϕ[~a] from the perspective of
M—is not definable in N . And so the current theorem is a consequence
of theorem 5, using that relation. 
Many of the various examples of non-absoluteness that we have men-
tioned in this article can now be seen as instances of corollary 6, as in
the following further corollary. In particular, statement (2) of corollary
7 is a strengthening of theorem 1, since we now get the models M1 and
M2 as elementary extensions of any given countable model M .
Corollary 7. Every countable model of set theory M has elementary
extensions M ≺M1 and M ≺ M2, respectively in each case, which. . .
(1) agree on their natural numbers with successor 〈N, S〉M1 = 〈N, S〉M2,
as well as on natural-number addition and order 〈N,+, <〉M1 =
〈N,+, <〉M2, but not on natural-number multiplication, so that
M1 thinks a · b = c for some particular natural numbers, but M2
disagrees.
•
N
M1 M2
M1,M2 |= ZFC
〈N, S,+,<〉M1 = 〈N, S,+,<〉M2
M1 believes N |= a · b = c
M2 believes N |= a · b 6= c
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(2) agree on their standard model of arithmetic 〈N,+, ·, 0, 1, <〉M1 =
〈N,+, ·, 0, 1, <〉M2, but which disagree on their theories of arith-
metic truth.
•
N
M1 M2
M1,M2 |= ZFC
NM1 = NM2
M1 believes N |= σ
M2 believes N |= ¬σ
(3) agree on their natural numbers NM1 = NM2, their reals RM1 =
R
M2 and their hereditarily countable sets 〈HC,∈〉M1 = 〈HC,∈〉M2,
but which disagree on their theories of projective truth.
•
HC
ω
M1 M2 M1,M2 |= ZFC
N
M1 = NM2 RM1 = RM2
〈HC,∈〉M1 = 〈HC,∈〉M2
M1 believes HC |= σ
M2 believes HC |= ¬σ
(4) agree on the structure 〈Hω2,∈〉
M1 = 〈Hω2,∈〉
M2, but which dis-
agree on truth in this structure.
•
Hω2
ω1
ω
M1 M2
M1,M2 |= ZFC
〈Hω2 ,∈〉
M1 = 〈Hω2 ,∈〉
M2
M1 believes Hω2 |= σ
M2 believes Hω2 |= ¬σ
(5) have a transitive rank-initial segment 〈Vδ,∈〉M1 = 〈Vδ,∈〉M2 in
common, but which disagree on truth in this structure.
•
Vδ
M1 M2
M1,M2 |= ZFC
V
M1
δ
= VM2
δ
|= ZFC
M1 believes Vδ |= σ
M2 believes Vδ |= ¬σ
Proof. What we mean by “respectively” is that each case may be ex-
hibited separately, using different pairs of extensions M1 andM2. Each
statement in the theorem is an immediate consequences of corollary 6
or of theorem 5. Thanks to Roman Kossak for pointing out state-
ment (1), which follows from theorem 5 because multiplication is not
definable in Presburger arithmetic 〈N,+, <〉, as the latter is a decid-
able theory. For statement (2), we apply corollary 6 to the structure
N = 〈N,+, ·, 0, 1, <〉M . For statement (3), one should clarify exactly
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what is meant by ‘projective truth,’ since it can be viewed variously as
the full second-order theory of the standard model of arithmetic, us-
ing P (N)M , or as the theory of the ordered real field 〈R,Z,+, ·, 0, 1, <〉
with a predicate for the integers, or as the theory of the set-theoretic
structure 〈Vω+1,∈〉, or of the structure of hereditarily countable sets
HC = 〈HC,∈〉. Nevertheless, these models are all interpretable in each
other, and one can view projective truth as the satisfaction relation for
any of them; and in each case, we make the conclusion of statement (3)
by using that structure in corollary 6. Notice that one can similarly
view arithmetic truth as residing in the structure of hereditarily finite
sets 〈HF,∈〉, which is mutually interpretable with the standard model
of arithmetic via the Ackermann encoding, and in this case, statements
(2), (3) and (4) can be seen as a progression, concerning the structures
Hω, Hω1 and Hω2 , a progression which continues, of course, to higher
orders in set theory. Statement (5) is similarly an immediate conse-
quence of corollary 6, using the structure N = 〈Vδ,∈〉
M . 
Let us explore a bit further how indefiniteness arises in the iter-
ated truth-about-truth hierarchy. Beginning with the standard model
of arithmetic N0 = 〈N,+, ·, 0, 1, <〉, we may define the standard truth
predicate Tr0 for assertions in the language of arithmetic, and consider
the structure N1 = 〈N,+, ·, 0, 1, <,Tr0〉, in the expanded language with
a predicate for the truth of arithmetic assertions. In this expanded
language, we may make assertions both about arithmetic and about
arithmetic truth. Climbing atop this structure, let Tr1 = Th(N1) be
its theory and form the next level of the iterated truths-about-truth
hierarchy N2 = 〈N,+, ·, 0, 1, <,Tr0,Tr1〉 by appending this new truths-
about-truth predicate. We may easily continue in this way, building
the finite levels of the hierarchy, each new truth predicate telling us
about the truth of arithmetic assertions involving only previous levels
of the iterated truth hierarchy. There is a rich literature on various
aspects of this iterated truth hierarchy, from Tarski [Tar83] to Kripke
[Kri75] and many others, including the related development of the re-
vision theory of truth [GB93]. Feferman [Fef91] treats the iteration of
truth as an example where once one accepts certain statements about
〈N,+, ·, 0, 1, <,Tr0, . . . ,Trn〉, then one ought accept certain other state-
ments about 〈N,+, ·, 0, 1, <,Tr0, . . . ,Trn〉.
Corollary 8. For every countable model of set theory M and any natu-
ral number n, there are elementary extensions M1 and M2 of M , which
have the same natural numbers NM1 = NM2, the same iterated arith-
metic truth predicates (Trk)
M1 = (Trk)
M2 for k < n and hence the same
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iterated truth structure up to n,
〈N,+, ·, 0, 1, <,Tr0, . . . ,Trn−1〉
M1 = 〈N,+, ·, 0, 1, <,Tr0, . . . ,Trn−1〉
M2,
but which disagree on the theory of this structure, and hence disagree
on the next order of truth, (Trn)
M1 6= (Trn)M2.
Proof. In other words, we will have (Nn)
M1 = (Nn)
M2, yet (Trn)
M1 6=
(Trn)
M2. This is an immediate consequence of corollary 6, using the
model N = (Nn)M . 
In particular, even the cases n = 0, 1 or 2 are interesting. The case
n = 0 amounts to theorem 1, and the case n = 1 shows that one can
have models of set theory M1 and M2 which have the same standard
model of arithmetic NM1 = NM2 and the same arithmetic truth TrM10 =
TrM20 , yet disagree in their theory of the theory of arithmetic truth
TrM11 6= Tr
M2
1 . Thus, even if one assumes a definite nature for the
structure of arithmetic, and also for arithmetic truth, then still there is
indefiniteness as to the nature of truths about arithmetic truth, and so
on throughout the iterated truth-about-truth hierarchy; indefiniteness
arises at any particular level.
The process of iterating the truth hierarchy of course continues trans-
finitely, for as long as we have some natural way of representing the
ordinals inside N, in order to undertake the Go¨del coding of formu-
las in the expanded language and retain the truth predicates as sub-
classes of N. If α is any computable ordinal, for example, then we have
a representation of α inside N using a computable relation of order
type α, and we may develop a natural Go¨del coding for ordinals up
to α and formulas in the language {+, ·, 0, 1, <,Trξ }ξ<α. If η < α and
Nη = 〈N,+, ·, 0, 1, <,Trξ〉ξ<η is defined up to η, then we form Nη+1 by
adding the ηth order truth predicate Trη for assertions in the language
of Nη, which can make reference to the simpler truth predicates Trξ
for ξ < η using the Go¨del coding established by the computability of
α. The higher levels of this truths-about-truth hierarchy provide truth
predicates for assertions about lower-level truths-about-truth for arith-
metic. We note that indefiniteness cannot arise at limit ordinal stages,
since when λ is a limit ordinal, then a sentence σ is true at stage λ
just in case it is true at any stage after which all the truth predicates
appearing in σ have arisen. In other words, Trλ =
⋃
ξ<λTrξ for any
limit ordinal λ. Nevertheless, we find it likely that there is version
of corollary 8 revealing indefiniteness in the transfinite realm of the
iterated truth hierarchy.
We conclude this section with some further applications of theorem
5, using non-definable predicates other than a satisfaction predicate.
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Corollary 9.
(1) Every countable model of set theory M has elementary exten-
sions M ≺ M1 and M ≺ M2, which agree on their standard
model of arithmetic NM1 = NM2 and have a computable linear
order ⊳ on N in common, yet M1 thinks 〈N,⊳〉 is a well-order
and M2 does not.
(2) Similarly, every such M has such M1 and M2, which agree on
their standard model of arithmetic NM1 = NM2, yet disagree on
Kleene’s O, with OM1 6= OM2.
(3) Every countable model of set theory M which thinks 0♯ exists
has elementary extensions M1 and M2, which agree on the or-
dinals up to any desired uncountable cardinal κ ∈ M , on the
constructible universe LM1κ = L
M2
κ up to κ and on the facts that
κ is an uncountable cardinal and 0♯ exists, yet disagree on which
ordinals below κ are the Silver indiscernibles. Similarly, we may
ensure that they disagree on 0♯, so that (0♯)M1 6= (0♯)M2.
Proof. These are each consequences of theorem 5. For statement (1),
consider the structure N = NM , with the predicate S = WOM , the set
of indices of computably enumerable well-orderings on N in M . This is
a Π11-complete set of natural numbers, and hence not first-order defin-
able in the structure N from the perspective of M . Thus, by theorem
5, we get models of set theory M1 and M2, elementarily extending M ,
which agree on NM1 = NM2 , yet disagree on WOM1 6= WOM2. So there
is some c.e. relation ⊳ in common, yet M1 (we may assume) thinks it
is a well-order and M2 does not. Since every c.e. order is isomorphic
to a computable order, we may furthermore assume that ⊳ is com-
putable, and the models will compute it with the same program, and
both see that it is a linear order, as desired. Statement (2) follows
as a consequence, since using the program computing ⊳, we may con-
struct deviations between OM1 and OM2 ; or alternatively, statement
(2) follows immediately from theorem 5, since O is not definable in
N. Statement (3) also follows from theorem 5, since the class of Silver
indiscernibles below κ is not definable in 〈Lκ,∈〉 in M , as from it we
could define a truth predicate for that structure. So there must be ex-
tensions which agree on 〈Lκ,∈〉M1 = 〈Lκ,∈〉M2 and on the fact that κ
is an uncountable cardinal and that 0♯ exists, yet disagree on the Silver
indiscernibles below κ. Similarly, s 0♯ also is not definable in 〈Lκ,∈〉,
we may make them disagree on 0♯. 
We expect that the reader will be able to construct many further
instances of the phenomenon. Here is another example we found strik-
ing.
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Theorem 10. Every countable model of set theory M has elementary
extensions M1 and M2, which agree on the structure of their standard
natural numbers 〈N,+, ·, 0, 1, <〉M1 = 〈N,+, ·, 0, 1, <〉M2, and which have
a set A ⊆ N in common, extensionally identical in M1 and M2, yet M1
thinks A is first-order definable in N and M2 thinks it is not.
The proof relies on the following lemma, which was conjectured by
the first author and asked on MathOverflow [Ham13b] specifically in
connection with this application. The question was answered there by
Andrew Marks, whose proof we adapt here.
Lemma 10.1 (Andrew Marks [Ham13b]). There is a subset B ⊆ N×N,
such that the set {n ∈ N | Bn is arithmetic } is not definable in the
structure 〈N,+, ·, 0, 1, <, B〉, where Bn = { k | (n, k) ∈ B } denotes the
nth section of B.
Proof. We identify N × N with N via Go¨del pairing. We use X ′ and
X(n) to denote the Turing jump of X and the nth Turing jump of X ,
respectively. Recall that a set X ⊆ N is n-generic if for every Σ0n subset
S ⊆ 2<ω, there is an initial segment of X that either is in S or has no
extension in S. A set is arithmetically generic if it is n-generic for every
n. It is a standard fact that if X is 1-generic, then X ′ ≡T 0′ ⊕X , and
if X is n-generic and Y is 1-generic relative to X ⊕ 0(n−1), then X ⊕ Y
is n-generic. Let A = 0(ω) = ⊕n0(n), which is Turing equivalent to the
set of true sentences of first order arithmetic. We shall construct a set
B with the following features:
(1) {n ∈ N | Bn is arithmetic } = A. More specifically, if n ∈ A,
then Bn is (n + 1)-generic and computable from 0
(n+1), and if
n /∈ A, then Bn is arithmetically generic.
(2) For each natural number k, the set Ck = ⊕i∈ωBmi is
(k + 1)-generic, where mi is the ith element of the set
{m ∈ N | m /∈ A or k ≤ m }.
Any set B with these features, we claim, fulfills the lemma. To see this,
we argue first by argue by induction that B(n) ≡T 0(n) ⊕ Cn for any
natural number n. This is immediate for n = 0, since C0 = ⊕mBm.
If B(n) ≡T 0(n) ⊕ Cn, then B(n+1) ≡T (0(n) ⊕ Cn)′ ≡T 0(n+1) ⊕ Cn,
since Cn is (n + 1)-generic and hence 1-generic relative to 0
(n), but
0(n+1) ⊕ Cn ≡T 0(n+1) ⊕ Cn+1 because either n /∈ A and so Cn = Cn+1
or n ∈ A so Cn+1 ≡T Bn ⊕ Cn, since Bn ≤T 0(n+1). So we have
established B(n) ≡T 0(n) ⊕ Cn. Since Cn is (n + 1)-generic, it follows
that 0(n) ⊕ Cn does not compute 0(n+1), and so also B(n) does not
compute 0(n+1). In particular, B(n) does not compute A for any n, and
so A is not arithmetically definable from B, as desired.
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It remains to construct the set B with features (1) and (2). We
do so in stages, where after stage n we will have completely speci-
fied B0, B1, . . . , Bn and finitely much additional information about B
on larger coordinates. To begin, let B0 be any set satisfying the re-
quirement of condition (1). We will ensure inductively that after each
stage n, the set Ck,n = Bm0 ⊕ . . .⊕ Bmj is (k + 1)-generic, where k ≤
n and m0, . . . , mj are the elements of {m ∈ N | m /∈ A or k ≤ m } ∩
{0, . . . , n}.
At stage n > 0, for each of the finitely many pairs (i, k) with i, k < n,
we let Si,k be the ith Σ
0
k+1 subset of 2
<ω, and if possible, we make a
finite extension to our current approximation to B so that the resulting
approximation to Ck extends an element of Si,k, thereby ensuring this
instance of (2). If there is no such extension, then since inductively
Ck,n−1 is (k + 1)-generic, there is already a finite part of our current
approximation to B that cannot be extended to extend an element of
Si,k, and this also ensures this instance of (2).
We complete stage n by specifying Bn. If n /∈ A, then we sim-
ply extend our current approximation to B by ensuring that Bn is
arithmetically generic relative to B0 ⊕ . . . ⊕ Bn−1. This ensures this
instance of (1) while maintaining our induction assumption that Ck,n is
(k+1)-generic for each k < n, since Ck,n−1 is (k+1)-generic and Bn is
(k+1)-generic relative to it; and similarly, Cn,n is now (n+1)-generic.
If n ∈ A, then we let Bn be any 0
(n+1)-computable (n + 1)-generic set
extending the finitely many bits of Bn specified in the current approx-
imation. For each k < n, let j0, . . . , jt be the elements of A in the
interval [k, n). Since our new Bn is 1-generic relative to 0
(n), which can
compute Bj0⊕. . .⊕Bjt , it follows that that Bj0⊕. . .⊕Bjt⊕Bn is (k+1)-
generic, and so Ck,n is (k+1)-generic, as the remaining elements in the
finite join defining Ck,n are mutually arithmetically generic with this;
and since Cn,n is n+1-generic, we maintain our induction assumption.
This completes the construction. We have fulfilled (1) explicitly by
the choice of Bn, and we fulfilled (2) by systematically deciding all the
required sets Si,k. 
Proof of theorem 10. Fix any countable model of set theory M . Apply
lemma 10.1 inside M , to find a predicate B ⊆ N× N in M , such that
the set S = {n ∈ N | Bn is arithmetic } is not definable in the struc-
ture N = 〈N,+, ·, 0, 1, <, B〉 from the perspective of M . It follows by
theorem 5 applied to this structure that there are elementary exten-
sions M1 and M2 of M , which agree on NM1 = NM2 and in particular
on NM1 = NM2 and BM1 = BM2, but not on SM1 6= SM2 . In partic-
ular, there is some section A = Bn that is arithmetic in M1 (we may
20 HAMKINS AND YANG
assume), but not in M2. But since the models agree on the predicate
B, they agree on all the sections of B and in particular have the set A
extensionally in common. 
4. Indefiniteness for specific types of sentences
Earlier in this article, we proved that the satisfaction relation N |=
σ for a first-order structure N is not generally absolute between the
various models of set theory containing that model and able to express
this satisfaction relation. But the proofs of non-absoluteness did not
generally reveal any specific nature for the sentences on which truth
can differ in different models of set theory. We should now like to
address this issue by presenting an alternative elementary proof of non-
absoluteness, using reflection and compactness, which shows that the
theory of a structure can vary on sentences whose specific nature we
can identify.
Define that a cardinal δ is Σn-correct if Vδ ≺Σn V , and the reflection
theorem shows that there is a proper class club C(n) of such cardinals.
The cardinal δ is fully correct, if it is Σn-correct for every n. This latter
notion is not expressible as a single assertion in the first-order language
of ZFC, but one may express it as a scheme of assertions about δ, in
a language with a constant for δ. Namely, let “Vδ ≺ V ” denote the
theory asserting of every formula ϕ in the language of set theory, that
∀x ∈ Vδ[ϕ(x) ↔ ϕ(x)Vδ ]. Since every finite subtheory of this scheme
is proved consistent in ZFC by the reflection theorem, it follows that
the theory is finitely consistent and so, by the compactness theorem,
ZFC + Vδ ≺ V is equiconsistent with ZFC. The reader may note that
since Vδ ≺ V asserts the elementarity separately for each formula, we
may not deduce in V that Vδ |= ZFC, but rather only for each axiom
of ZFC separately, that Vδ satisfies that axiom.
Theorem 11. Every countable model of set theory M |= ZFC has ele-
mentary extensions M1 and M2, with a transitive rank-initial segment
〈Vδ,∈〉M1 = 〈Vδ,∈〉M2 in common, such that M1 thinks that the least
natural number n for which Vδ violates Σn-collection is even, but M2
thinks it is odd.
•
Vδ
M1 M2 M1,M2 |= ZFC
V
M1
δ
= VM2
δ
n is least with ¬Σn-collection in Vδ
M1 believes n is even
M2 believes n is odd
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Proof. Suppose that M is a countable model of ZFC, and consider the
theory:
T1 = ∆(M) + Vδ ≺ V + {m ∈ Vδ | m ∈M }
+ the least n such that Vδ 2 Σn-collection is even,
where ∆(M) is the elementary diagram ofM , in the language of set the-
ory having constants for every element of M . Note that the first three
components of T1 as it is described above are each infinite schemes,
whereas the final assertion “the least n. . . ,” which we take also to as-
sert that there is such an n, is expressible as a single sentence about δ in
the language of set theory, using the ZFC-definable satisfaction relation
for 〈Vδ,∈〉. We claim that this theory is consistent. Consider any finite
subtheory t ⊆ T1. We shall find a δ in M such that M with this δ will
satisfy every assertion in t. Let k be a sufficiently large odd number, so
that every formula appearing in any part of t has complexity at most
Σk, and let δ be the next Σk-correct cardinal in M above the largest
rank of an element of M whose constant appears in t. We claim now
that 〈M,∈M , δ,m〉m∈M |= t. First, it clearly satisfies all of ∆(M); and
since δ is Σk-correct in M , we have V
M
δ ≺Σk M , and since also δ was
large enough to be above any of the constants of M appearing in t, we
attain any instances from the first three components of the theory that
are in the finite sub-theory t; since δ is Σk-correct in M , it follows that
V Mδ satisfies every instance of Σk-collection; but since δ is not a limit of
Σk-correct cardinals (since it is the “next” one after a certain ordinal),
it follows that V Mδ does not satisfy Σk+1-collection, and so the least n
such that V Mδ 6|= Σn-collection is precisely n = k+1, which is even. So
T1 is finitely consistent and thus consistent. Similarly, the theory
T2 = ∆(M) + Vδ ≺ V + {m ∈ Vδ | m ∈M }
+ the least n such that Vδ 2 Σn-collection is odd
is also consistent.
As before, let 〈M1,M2〉 be a computably saturated model pair, such
that M1 |= T1 and M2 |= T2. It follows that 〈V
M1
δ , V
M2
δ 〉 is a com-
putably saturated model pair of elementary extensions of 〈M,∈M 〉,
which are therefore elementarily equivalent in the language of set the-
ory with constants for elements of M , and hence isomorphic by an
isomorphism respecting those constants. So we may assume without
loss of generality that 〈M,∈M〉 ≺ 〈Vδ,∈〉M1 = 〈Vδ,∈〉M2. Meanwhile,
M1 thinks that this Vδ violates Σn-collection first at an even n and M2
thinks it does so first for an odd n, since these assertions are part of
the theories T1 and T2, respectively. 
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An alternative version of theorem 11, with essentially the same proof,
produces elementary extensions M1 and M2 of M with a rank initial
segment V M1δ = V
M2
δ in common, but M1 thinks the least n for which
Vδ is not Σn-correct is even, but M2 thinks it is odd.
By looking not just at the parity of the least n where Σn-collection
(or Σn-correctness) fails, but rather, say, at the k
th binary digit, we can
easily make infinitely many different elementary extensions M1,M2, . . .
ofM , with the natural numbers NMk and V Mkδ all in common, but such
that Mk thinks that the least n for which this Vδ violates Σn-collection
is a number with exactly k many prime factors. In particular, even
though they have the same structure 〈Vδ,∈〉
Mk , they each think specific
incompatible things about the theory of this structure.
5. “Being a model of ZFC” is not absolute
In this section, we prove that the question of whether a given tran-
sitive rank initial segment Vδ of the universe is a model of ZFC is not
absolute between models of set theory with that rank initial segment
in common. Recall that a cardinal δ is worldly, if Vδ |= ZFC.
Theorem 12. If M is a countable model of set theory in which the
worldly cardinals form a stationary proper class (it would suffice, for ex-
ample, that M |= Ord is Mahlo), then there are elementary extensions
M1 and M2, which have a transitive rank initial segment 〈Vδ,∈〉M1 =
〈Vδ,∈〉M2 in common, such that M1 thinks Vδ |= ZFC but M2 thinks
Vδ 6|= ZFC. Moreover, such extensions can be found for which δ is fully
correct in both M1 and M2, and furthermore in which M ≺ V
M1
δ =
V M2δ .
•
Vδ
M1 M2
M1,M2 |= ZFC
〈Vδ,∈〉
M1 = 〈Vδ,∈〉
M2
M1 believes Vδ |= ZFC
M2 believes Vδ 6|= ZFC
Proof. Fix any countable model M |= ZFC, such that the worldly
cardinals form a stationary proper class in M . That is, every definable
proper class club C ⊆ Ord in M contains some δ that is worldly in M .
Let T1 be the theory consisting of the elementary diagram ∆(M) plus
the scheme of assertions Vδ ≺ V , in the language with a new constant
symbol for δ, plus the assertions a ∈ Vδ for each constant symbol a
for an element a ∈ M , plus the assertion “δ is worldly,” which is to
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say, the assertion that Vδ |= ZFC. Suppose that t is a finite subtheory
of T1, which therefore involves only finitely many instances from the
Vδ ≺ V scheme. Let n be large enough so that all the formulas ϕ
in these instances have complexity at most Σn. Since the Σn-correct
cardinals form a closed unbounded class and the worldly cardinals are
stationary, there is a Σn-correct worldly cardinal δ in M . It follows
that M satisfies all the formulas in t using this δ, and so the theory T1
is finitely consistent and hence consistent.
Let T2 be the theory consisting of the elementary diagram ∆(M), the
scheme Vδ ≺ V plus the assertion “δ is not worldly.” This theory also
is finitely consistent, since if t ⊆ T2 is finite, then let n be beyond the
complexity of any formula appearing as an instance of Vδ ≺ V in t, and
let δ be a Σn correct cardinal inM that is not worldly (for example, we
could let δ be the next Σn-correct cardinal after some ordinal; this can
never be worldly since Vδ will not satisfy Σn-reflection). It follows that
M with this δ satisfies every assertion in t, showing that T2 is finitely
consistent and hence consistent.
〈Vδ,∈〉
M1 ≺ 〈M1,∈
M1〉
≺
〈M,∈M〉 =
≺
〈Vδ,∈〉
M2 ≺ 〈M2,∈
M2〉
Let 〈M1,M2〉 be a computably saturated model pair, where M1 |=
T1 and M2 |= T2. It follows that 〈V
M1
δ , V
M2
δ 〉 is also a computably
saturated model pair of models of set theory, and these both satisfy
the elementary diagram of M . Consequently, they are isomorphic by
an isomorphism that respects the interpretation of M in them, and so
by replacing with an isomorphic copy, we may assume that 〈Vδ,∈〉M1 =
〈Vδ,∈〉M2. The theories T1 and T2 ensure that Vδ ≺ V in both M1 and
M2, that M ≺ Vδ, and furthermore, that M1 |= δ is worldly and
M2 |= δ is not worldly, or in other words, M1 |= (Vδ |= ZFC), but
M2 |= (Vδ 6|= ZFC), as desired. 
The hypothesis that the worldly cardinals form a stationary proper
class is a consequence of the (strictly stronger) Le´vy scheme, also known
as Ord is Mahlo, asserting in effect that the inaccessible cardinals form
a stationary proper class. This is in turn strictly weaker in consistency
strength than the existence of a single Mahlo cardinal, since if κ is
Mahlo, then Vκ |= Ord is Mahlo. So these are all rather weak large
cardinal hypotheses, in terms of the large cardinal hierarchy. Mean-
while, the conclusion already explicitly has large cardinal strength,
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since M1 |= δ is worldly. Furthermore, the “Moreover,. . . ” part of the
conclusion makes the hypothesis optimal, since if M1 |= δ is worldly
and fully correct, then the worldly cardinals of M1 form a stationary
proper class in V M1δ , as any definable class club there extends to a class
club in M1 containing δ.
As an example to illustrate the range of non-absoluteness, consider
the case where M is a model of ZFC in which the worldly limits of
Woodin cardinals are stationary. It follows from theorem 12 that there
are elementary extensionsM1 andM2 ofM with a common rank initial
segment 〈Vδ,∈〉
M1 = 〈Vδ,∈〉
M2 , such that
M1 |= (Vδ |= ZFC+ there are a proper class of Woodin cardinals),
but
M2 |= (Vδ 6|= ZFC+ there are a proper class of Woodin cardinals).
The proof shows that from the perspective of M2, the common Vδ
does not satisfy Σn-replacement for sufficiently large n, even though it
satisfies full replacement from the perspective of M1, which has all the
same formulas.
We conclude this section with an observation that many have found
curious. We learned this result from Brice Halimi [Hal], but the proof
is classical, and the result may be folklore. If M = 〈M,∈M〉 is any
model of set theory, andM |= 〈m,E〉 is a first-order structure, then we
may regard 〈m,E〉 as an actual first-order structure in V , with domain
{ a ∈M | M |= a ∈ m } and relation a E b ↔ M |= a E b. Thus,
we extract the existential content of the structure from M to form an
actual structure in V .
Theorem 13 ([Hal]). Every model of ZFC has an element that is a
model of ZFC. Specifically, if 〈M,∈M〉 |= ZFC, then there is an ob-
ject 〈m,E〉 in M, which when extracted as an actual structure in V ,
satisfies ZFC.
Proof. Consider first the case that M is ω-nonstandard. By the re-
flection theorem, any particular finite fragment of ZFC is true in some
〈V Mδ ,∈〉
M, and so by overspill there must be some δ inM for whichM
believes 〈Vδ,∈〉
M satisfies a nonstandard fragment of ZFC, and so in
particular it will satisfy the actual ZFC, as desired. Meanwhile, if M
is ω-standard, then it must satisfy Con(ZFC) and so it can build the
Henkin model of ZFC. So in any case, there is a model of ZFC inside
M. 
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What surprises some is that the argument succeeds even whenM |=
¬Con(ZFC), for although M thinks there is no model of ZFC, never-
theless it has many actual models of ZFC, which it rejects because its
ω-nonstandard nature causes it to have a false understanding of what
ZFC is. In the ω-nonstandard case of theorem 13, the model 〈Vδ,∈〉M
that is produced is actually a model of ZFC, although M thinks it
fails to satisfy some nonstandard part of ZFC. Perhaps one way of
highlighting the issue is to point out that the theorem asserts that ev-
ery modelM of ZFC has an element 〈m,E〉, such that for every axiom
σ of ZFC, the model M believes 〈m,E〉 |= σ; this is different from M
believing that 〈m,E〉 satisfies every axiom of ZFC, since when M is
ω-nonstandard it has additional axioms not present in the metatheory.
6. Conclusions
Let us now return to the philosophical issues with which we be-
gan this article. The main concern is whether the definiteness of
arithmetic truth can be seen as a consequence of the definiteness of
the underlying mathematical objects and structure, or to put it sim-
ply, whether definiteness-about-truth follows from definiteness-about-
objects and definiteness-about-structure. Many mathematicians and
philosophers seem to think that it does. We noted in the introduction,
for example, that Feferman seems to support this when he writes:
In my view, the conception [of the bare order structure
of the natural numbers N, with its least element and
the attendant operations of successor and predecessor] is
completely clear, and thence all arithmetical statements
are definite. [Fef13, p.6–7] (emphasis original)
Donald Martin, as we mentioned, makes a similar point in his article,
presented in the same conference series:
The concept of the natural numbers is first-order com-
plete: it determines truth values for all sentences of first-
order arithmetic. That is, it implies each first-order sen-
tence or its negation. (p. 3)
What I am suggesting is that the real reason for con-
fidence in first-order completeness is our confidence in
the full determinateness of the concept of the natural
numbers. [Mar12, p. 13]
And others have made similar remarks. The idea, quite naturally,
is that there can be no indeterminateness in our theory of arithmetic
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truth, if the mathematical structure in which that truth resides is com-
pletely definite and determined. No blurriness or fuzziness will sneak
into our judgement of arithmetic truths, if there is none in the underly-
ing mathematical objects and structure. Thus, on this view, if there is
any indeterminism or indefiniteness in mathematics, it was not born in
the region between definite natural number objects and structure and
definite arithmetic truth.
Our main thesis, in contrast, is that the definiteness of the theory
of truth for a structure does not follow as a consequence of the def-
initeness the structure in which that truth resides. Even in the case
of arithmetic truth and the standard model of arithmetic N, we claim,
it is a philosophical error to deduce that arithmetic truth is definite
just on the basis that the natural numbers themselves and the natural
number structure 〈N,+, ·, 0, 1, <〉 is definite. At bottom, our claim is
that one does not get definiteness-of-truth for free from definiteness-of-
objects and definiteness-of-structure, and that, rather, one must make
a separate analysis and justification for this additional, higher-order
claim about mathematical ontology.
The main part of our argument for this is a simple appeal to the
mathematical results contained in the previous sections of this article,
particularly theorems 1 and 5 and their corollaries, which describe sit-
uations in which it seems that we may have definiteness about objects
and structure, but not about the truths residing in that structure. The
point is that these situations, for all we know, could be the actual math-
ematical ontology of our set theoretic concepts, and thus we would be
in error to deduce the definiteness of our theory of truth just from the
definiteness of the mathematical structure in which that truth resides.
Specifically, theorem 1 shows that there can be models of set theory
M1 and M2, which agree completely on the objects, functions and re-
lations of a particular mathematical structure, even on what they view
as the standard model of arithmetic 〈N,+, ·, 0, 1, <〉, yet disagree on
the theory of that structure. Imagine that we are actually living inside
the world M1, using the set theory provided by M1 as our background
set-theoretic ontology. Perhaps we are philosophically committed to
the definite nature of the natural numbers 0, 1, 2, . . ., as we know and
experience them inside M1, finding them to have a clear and distinct
existence. And what would it mean for us to assert that arithmetic
truth is similarly definite, given our commitment to the definite nature
of the natural numbers as we know them in M1? Well, it would mean
that in any other set-theoretic world having exactly the same natural
numbers as we have in M1, that the determination of arithmetic truth
should work out exactly the same as it does for us in M1. But this is a
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claim that is refuted by the situation of theorem 1, for indeed there is
another set-theoretic universe M2, which has exactly the same natural
numbers and natural number structure as we have in M1, yet comes to
different conclusions about which particular arithmetic sentences are
true there. There is an arithmetic sentence σ in M1 and M2 such that
M1 |= N |= σ, but M2 |= N |= ¬σ. It seems that, living in M1, we
could have a clear and distinct concept of the natural numbers, yet
meanwhile, there is another world out there, M2, with the same natu-
ral numbers as we have and yet which has different arithmetic truths.
Thus, it was a mistake for us to conclude the definiteness of arith-
metic truth from our presumed definiteness of arithmetic objects and
structure.
How exactly does this indefiniteness about truth arise? In order for
it to happen, the two models M1 and M2 must have different second-
order arithmetic. For example, neither model will be able to see the
arithmetic truth predicates of the other, because both of these predi-
cates obey the Tarskian truth conditions and one may easily prove by
induction that any two predicates satisfying the Tarskian conditions
must agree universally. So neither model can have access to the arith-
metic truth predicate of the other, and in particular, the models cannot
agree on the power set of the natural numbers; so they cannot agree
on the real numbers. In this way, indefiniteness of truth is a manifes-
tation of indefiniteness in the ontology of second-order objects. This is
part of the reason why we hold that a commitment to a definite theory
of truth for a structure is a higher-order ontological commitment that
goes strictly beyond the commitment to a definite nature for the un-
derlying structure itself. The assertion that there is definite arithmetic
truth is a claim about the definiteness of certain second-order objects,
asserting the unique existence of a truth predicate fulfilling the Tarski
truth conditions. The existence and nature of such an object seems to
be in another realm, the higher order realm of subsets of the structure,
rather than directly realized inside the structure.
The claim of definiteness for arithmetic truth amounts in a certain
sense to a claim that one’s meta-theoretic concept of natural number
aligns with the natural number concept in the object theory. One may
prove by induction in the meta-theory, after all, that the truth of any
standard-finite arithmetic sentence (that is, finite with the respect to
the meta-theoretic natural number concept) is invariant with respect
to any change in the set-theoretic background having the same natural
number objects and structure. This is simply another way to look upon
the fact that any two truth predicates on a given model of arithmetic
must agree on their judgements for standard-finite formulas. Perhaps
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both Feferman and Martin, in their displayed quotations at the be-
ginning of this section, would agree that the perceived clarity of the
natural number concept leads them to have the same concept in both
the meta-theory as in the object theory. And surely if one can be
confident that one’s meta-theoretic natural number concept coincides
with the object-theoretic account, then one should expect definiteness
of arithmetic truth. But what we would desire is an account of how
this identity is supposed to work.
It would be natural to object to our argument using M1 and M2 on
the grounds that these models are ω-nonstandard, and furthermore,
every instance of this kind of non-determinism will be with models
whose natural numbers are non-standard. Such an argument, however,
seems to us to beg the question, since the issue is whether definiteness
of truth follows from definiteness of objects and structure, not whether
it follows from definiteness of objects and structure and the knowledge
that those objects are ”standard” with respect to some other meta-
mathematical conception of standardness. One would want to know,
for example, about whether that conception of standardness is itself
definite, for it is easy enough to establish that the concept of whether
a given model of arithmetic is standard or not is not absolute between
all models of set theory. In any case, to augment the argument for
definite truth by making additional claims about the special nature
of the natural numbers, going beyond their mere definiteness, merely
serves to verify our main point, which is that indeed something more
needs to be said about it.
Another objection might come from a faction of inhabitants living in
the universe M1, empirical realists with respect to mathematics, who
have direct mathematical experience of the mathematical objects of
M1, but who after Kant reject transcendental knowledge of the objects
in M2 as things-in-themselves outside of the ontology of their universe
M1. Thus, they may reject the alternative arithmetic theory of truth
provided by M2 as not providing an actual counterexample to the defi-
niteness of their theory of arithmetic truth, as the set-theoretic concepts
of M2 lie inaccessibly beyond the framework of concepts available to
them in M1. As a result, the nature and features of M2 are pseudo-
problems for the people in M1, and they will reject our argument as
not providing an actual counterexample to their claim of definite truth.
But do we have the burden of arguing with ostriches? The point is
that we have described how it could be that another universe has the
same natural numbers and natural number structure as exists in the
universe M1, but different arithmetic truths, whether or not people
living only in M1 can appreciate it, and of course such an alternative
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universe will not be available inside M1. A similar situation occurred
with Kant’s views on the fundamental nature of geometry, when Kant’s
promise was essentially destroyed with the rise of non-Euclidean geom-
etry and developments in modern physics. Similar developments in
set theory provide evidence of a pluralist nature for our fundamental
set-theoretic conceptions, with the result that it is not so clear how we
may determine in which mathematical universe we actually live. We
take ourselves to have explained how it is possible that there can be
indefiniteness in the theory of a structure that is definite, and so we
place the burden on those who assert the definiteness of their theory of
arithmetic truth to provide reasons that go beyond the definiteness of
the natural number structure itself. For example, perhaps the inhab-
itants of M1 will attempt to argue for the definiteness of their entire
set-theoretic universe, arguing that it is the one true universe of all
sets. If successful, this would certainly satisfy our objection.
Roman Kossak has objected to our argument by attempting to un-
dercut the support provided for it by theorem 1. Although that theo-
rem provides models of set theory M1 and M2 with the same natural
number structures NM1 = NM2 and different truths M1 |= N |= σ and
M2 |= N |= ¬σ, Kossak argues that the meaning of the sentence σ has
changed when moving from M1 to M2. Indeed, the proof shows that
M1 and M2 are isomorphic by an isomorphism π mapping some other
sentence τ to σ, and so inM2, Kossak argues, the sentence σ carries the
same meaning that τ carried in M1, rather than the meaning carried
by σ itself in M1. Similarly, in corollary 7 statement (4) and theorem
11, Kossak argues that the meaning of the ordinal δ has changed in the
move from M1 to M2.
This is an interesting and forceful objection, which if correct would
undercut our main thesis. To reply, we argue that the meaning of any
sentence σ is most naturally and best construed as precisely what that
sentence itself expresses, and so the meaning of σ in M1 is precisely
the same as the meaning of σ in M2, particularly in the light of the
fact that also NM1 = NM2 . In particular, all the fundamental syntactic
features of σ are the same inM1 as inM2, including the quantifier com-
plexity, the scopes of quantifiers and the construction tree witnessing
that σ is a well-formed formula; these are all identical in M1 as in M2.
Although we agree that the truth of an arithmetic sentence depends
on the existence and nature of a second-order object—the arithmetic
truth predicate—nevertheless the meaning of a sentence is more tightly
connected with the syntactic nature of that sentence; the meaning is
precisely whatever that sentence itself expresses. So it is not the mean-
ing of σ that changed in the move from M1 to M2, we argue, but the
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truth of σ that changed. There is of course an analogy between σ in
M2 and τ in M1, an analogy that is made precise and robust by the
fact that they are automorphic images of each other. In the end, we
find Kossak’s point to be not an objection to the argument, but rather
an explanation of how it could come to be that arithmetic truth can
vary without the objects and structure of arithmetic changing. That
is, we take his observation to be an explanation of how the phenom-
enon can occur, rather than as a refutation of it. Similarly, to argue
that δ refers in M2 to something other than δ itself would seem to be a
very hard task for Kossak. He replies to this by asking whether there
is any meaning of δ at all other than that given by the semantics of
the ambient universe? We believe that there is, since δ is a particular
ordinal that both M1 and M2 have in common, and they agree on the
cumulative hiearchy Vδ up to stage δ, and one may inquire about the
properties of this common object in M1 and M2. Our point is that
because M1 and M2 agree on Vδ, they will be forced to have a cer-
tain level of agreement of their theories of truth for this structure, but
this agreement is not necessarily universal and ultimately M1 and M2
can disagree on whether certain statements are true in that common
structure.
In connection with this objection, Kossak considered whether there
is any other method of producing examples where a given model of
arithmetic has alternative truth predicates, and specifically, whether
two models of set theory can have the same natural numbers, but
non-isomorphic theories of arithmetic truth. That is, the question is
whether one can have models for which
〈N,+, ·, 0, 1, <〉M1 = 〈N,+, ·, 0, 1, <〉M2, but
〈N,+, ·, 0, 1, <,TA〉M1 6∼= 〈N,+, ·, 0, 1, <,TA〉M2.
Jim Schmerl observed that indeed this situation occurs, arguing essen-
tially as follows: the theory T = TA + Th(N,TA)ZFC, in the language
with a satisfaction predicate Tr, is computable from 0(ω), but the the-
ory of 〈N,+, ·, 0, 1, <,TA〉 has degree 0(ω+ω), and so T is not complete
in the expanded language. It follows that there are computably satu-
rated models 〈N ,Tr1〉 and 〈N ,Tr2〉 of T , which have the same reduct
to the language of arithmetic, but which are not elementarily equiva-
lent in the full language and hence also not isomorphic. But since these
models are computably saturated models of Th(N,TA)ZFC, it follows by
proposition 4 that they are both ZFC-standard, arising as the standard
model of arithmetic and arithmetic truth 〈N,TA〉M1 〈N,TA〉M2 inside
models of ZFC, as desired. This kind of example therefore seems to
address Kossak’s objection on the meaning of σ, while still establishing
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our main point, for in this case there is no automorphism providing one
with an alternative meaning for the sentence σ on which the models
disagree.
Peter Koellner [Koe13] emphasizes that there is a hierarchy of po-
sitions to take on pluralism in mathematics, depending on where one
expects indeterminism to first arise in mathematics, if it does so at all.
But, in fact, many people are non-pluralists with re-
gard to certain branches of mathematics and pluralists
with regard to others. For example, a very popular
view in the foundations of mathematics embraces non-
pluralism for first-order number theory while defending
pluralism for the higher reaches of set theory. Most peo-
ple would, for example, maintain that the Riemann Hy-
pothesis (which is equivalent to a Π01-statement of arith-
metic) has a determinate truth-value and yet there are
many who maintain that CH (a statement of set theory,
indeed, of third-order arithmetic) does not have a deter-
minate truth-value. Feferman is an example of someone
who holds this position. So instead of two positions—
pluralism versus non-pluralism—we really have a hier-
archy of positions. [Koe13]
Summarizing the spectrum, on one end we have what might be de-
scribed as the hard-core set-theoretic Platonists, such as Isaacson [Isa08]
(and to a more qualified extent, Woodin and Maddy [Mad88a, Mad88b]),
who affirm the existence of the universe of all sets, in which set-theoretic
claims such as CH have a definite truth value that we might come to
know. Steel softens this position by allowing a restricted pluralism
of mutually interpretable theories, such as occurs in the interaction
of large cardinals, inner model theory and the theory of the axiom of
determinacy. Martin [Mar01] considers the case for determinism in
set theory, but declining a full endorsement, argues instead only that
there is at most one concept of set meeting his criteria, leaving ex-
plicitly open the possibility that in fact there is none. In the center
of the spectrum we are considering, Feferman [Fef99] is committed to
the Platonic existence of the natural numbers, while remaining circum-
spect about the definiteness of higher-order set-theoretic objects and
truth. He asserts that “the origin of Dedekind-Peano axioms is a clear
intuitive concept,” while the intuition for set theory “is a far cry from
what leads one to accept the Dedekind-Peano axioms,” and based on
the dichotomy between the ontological status of the structure of natu-
ral numbers and of the structure of higher types, he concludes that “the
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Continuum Hypothesis is an inherently vague problem that no new ax-
iom will settle in a convincingly definite way.” Meanwhile, Hamkins
[Ham, Ham13a, Ham11, Ham12, GH10] advances a more radical mul-
tiverse perspective that embraces pluralism even with respect to arith-
metic truth. He criticizes the categoricity arguments for arithmetic
definiteness—which are also used to justify higher-order definiteness,
as in Isaacson [Isa08]—as unsatisfactorily circular, in that they attempt
to establish the definiteness of the natural number concept by appeal
to second-order features involving a consideration of arbitrary subsets,
which we would seem to have even less reason to think of as definite.
More extreme positions, such as ultrafinitism, lie further along.
To conclude, perhaps Feferman and the others will reply to the ar-
gument we have given in this article by saying that their conception of
the natural numbers 0, 1, 2, . . . and the natural number structure is so
clear and distinct that they can use this overwhelming definiteness to
see that arithmetic truth must also be definite. That is, perhaps they
reply to our objection by saying that they did not base the definiteness
of arithmetic truth solely on the fact that the natural number objects
and structure are definite, but rather on something more, on the special
nature of the definiteness of natural number objects and structure that
they assert is manifest. For example, perhaps they would elaborate by
explaining that arithmetic truth must be definite, because any indef-
initeness would reveal a proper cut in the natural numbers: consider
the natural numbers n for which Σn truth is definite and argue that
this contains 0 and is closed under successors. Our response to such a
reply, after first getting in the obvious objection about the indefinite
nature of definiteness and whether it can be used in a mathematical
induction in this way, would be to say that yes, indeed, this kind of fur-
ther discussion and justification is exactly what we call for. Our main
point, after all, is that definiteness-about-truth does not follow for free
from definiteness-about-objects and that one must say something more
about it.
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